Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1983

Claron D. Bailey v. Deseret Federal Savings And Loan Association :
Brief of Respondent

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2

Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.J. Steven Newton; Attorney for Respondent
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Bailey v. Deseret Federal, No. 18961 (1983).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/4474

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

CLARON D. BAILEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No. 18961

vs.
DESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS AND
LOAN ASSOCIATION,

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,
THE HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON, PRESIDING

J. STEVEN NEWTON
NEWTON & IVINS

1325 South Main Street
Suite 201
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Attorneys for Respondent
EDWARD M. GARRETT
JOSEPH E. HATCH
GARRETT AND STURDY

311 South State Street
Suite 320
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant

FI l ED
AUG 111993
Cod, Supnme Court, Utali

TABLE OF CONTENTS
STATEMENT OF CASE . . . . . . .

1

DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT.

1

RELIEF SOUGl:fT ON APPEAL

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS. . .

2

ARGUMENT:
POINT I
THE BANKRUPTCY COURT'S DISMISSAL OF
MR. BAILEY'S COMPLAINT WAS NOT RES
JUDICATA AS TO THE ISSUES TRIED SINCE
BOTH THE POSITIONS OF THE PARTIZS AND
THE ISSUES WERE DIFFERENT IN STATE COURT. . . 5
POINT II
THE BANKRUPTCY COURT'S ORDER ON ITS FACE
CLEARLY DOES NOT EXTEND THE JURISDICTION
OF THE BANKRUPTCY COURT THROUGH TO THE
PROCEEDS OF SALE. . . . .
. . . . . . . . . 12
POINT III
DEFENDANT FAILED TO FOLLOW APPROPRIATE
PROCEDURE FOR HAULTING THE ACTION IN
STATE COURT
CONCLUSION

. 14
. 14

CASES SITED
Conway v.

Mosher,

103 P. 2d 456 (Ariz., 1940)

. . . . . . . .. · . 7

Jayhawk Equipment Co. v. Mentzer,
379 P.2d 342 (Kan., 1963) . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Krofcheck v. Downey State Bank,
580 P. 2d 243 (Utah, 1978) . . . . . . . . . · · · · 7
In re Polumbo,

-

271 F. Supp (D.C. Va., 1967) . . . . . . . . · · .13

Vance v. Vance,

601 P. 2d 605 (Ariz., 1979) . . . . . . . . . . · .10

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CLARON D. BAILEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 18961

DESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS AND
LOAN ASSOCIATION,
Defendant-Appellant.
BRIEF OF RESBONDENT

STATEMENT OF CASE
Mr. Bailey, Assignee of a second position Trust Deed sued
defendant, Trustee on the first position Trust Deed, for an accounting and for distribution of the excess proceeds of a Trustee's Sale.
The court below found that the amount bid exceeded the amount due
to Beneficiary of the Trust Deed and awarded the excess to plaintiff.
Defendant appeals, claiming the lower court had no jurisdiction
and/or that the case was barred by res judicata.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This matter was tried, without a jury, before the Honorable
Homer F. Wilkinson of the Third Judicial District Court, on the
1st and 2nd days of July, 1982.

After the close of the evidence

and the submitting of legal memoranda by both parties, the Court
entered its Memorandum

on July 30, 1982.

On January 7,

1982, the Court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Judgment awarding to Plaintiff and against Defendant the total

-2sum of Two Thousand Thirty Two Dollars and Fifty-Eight Cl'nts
($2,032.58) together with interest and custs uf courl.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON
APPEAL
·---Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment of the court belo•.·.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent agrees with Appellant's statement of facts where
not inconsistent with the statement below.
Deseret Federal Savings and Loan Association hereinafter refer;.
to as "the bank", without notice to the junior lien claimant's,
petitioned the bankruptcy court to order the bankruptcy trustee to
surrender possession of Lot 46 HIDDEN VALLEY HILLS No. 1 Subdivisior
praying as follows:
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays that JOHN C. GREEN, Trustee,
be directed to surrender possession of Lots 19, 44, 46 and
21,
and that plaintiff be allowed to complete the sale of
said real property at Trustee's Sale: (R. 39)
The bankruptcy court ruled "that the relief sought in the complaint
by Deseret Federal Savings and Loan is granted

" (R.

42)

The bank, acting as Trustee, then noticed the sale of Lot 46.
Upon learning of the pending sale, Mr. Bailey filed a complaint in
bankruptcy court as a third position mechanic's lien holder and as
a sixth position purchaser on a Uniform Real Estate Contract from
the bankrupts to prevent the Trustee's Sale of the property and to
invalidate the banks first position.

(R.

43)

Mr. Bailey's Complaint prayed basically as follows:
1.

That defendant's Trust Deed be voided.

2.

That plaintiff be allowed to bring the loan current.

3.

That the bankruptcy Trustee abandon and disclaim any

- 3interest in and to the subject property as a burdensome asset.
4.

That the court enjoin the Trustee's Sale.

5.

That the court award damages to plaintiff against defendant

f"r wrongful dispersal of loan funds.

(R. 48)

Though Mr. Bailey obtained an Order staying the Trustee's Sale,
it was not timely served, and the Sale proceeded.

(R. 63)

At sale

the bank bid Forty Eight Thousand Nine Hundred and Seventy Four
Dollars and Fourteen Cents ($48,974.14) which bid exceeded the amount
actually due the bank by $2,032.58 according to the findings of the
court (R. 122-125).
complaint dismissed.

After sale the bank moved to have Mr. Bailey's
The court dismissed the complaint.

Mr. Bailey, taking the position of second lien holder which he
had obtained by assignment from Ivory and Company, then brought an
action in the Third Judicial District Court.

Mr. Bailey's state

court action for the first time raised the statutory claim under
U.C.A. 57-1-29* requesting distribution of the proceeds of the
Trustee's Sale against the bank as trustee.

Thought Hr. Bailey's

complaint contained other claims against the bank, only the claim
under U.C.A. 57-1-29 for distribution of excess proceeds at
Trustee's Sale was considered by the court as a basis for its award.
(R. 122-123)
The bank, prior to trial, brought a Motion for Summary Judgment
claiming that the bankruptcy court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint was res judicata as to Mr. Bailey's state court claims.

In

response to defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Mr. Bailey's
counsel provided an Affidavit to the court, which Affidavit was
uncontested by defendant.

*

It provides in pertinent part as follows:

For full text of U.C.A. 57-1-29, see Appendix 1

-4[Referring to the statements of Judge Ralph R.
Mabey at the hearing defendant's Motion to Dismiss
on November 13, 1979]
The Judge stated that because of the secured claims on
the subject property, and the amount of the proceeds at the
Trust Deed Trustee's Sale, the bankruptcy trustee, John
Green, would have no claim on those proceeds, and the Bankruptcy Court would not be interested in adjudicating the
claims to those funds.
Therefore, the bankruptcy Judge
suggested that the Bankruptcy Court should not be involved
in this aspect of this matter, i.e. the adjudication of
priority in the funds received by the trustee, Edward M.
Garrett, acting on behalf of the defendant.
That he, the affiant, has on several occasions had
telephone conversations with the bankruptcy trustee, John
Green. That John Green, as trustee, has made the following
representations:
(a) That he, as trustee, has no claim on the proceeds
of the Trust Deed Trustee's Sale, conducted on behalf of
the defendant on November 9, 1979.

(b) That the order of the bankruptcy court (Exhibit
"C") was drafted for the purpose of extinguishing the rights
of the junior lien claimants to the subject property such
that if the property were thereafter sold by the defendant,
Deseret Federal, Deseret would be required to account to
the bankruptcy court for the funds received from such subsequent sale in excess of those paid at the original trustee'
sale on November 9, 1979.

(c) That as far as he is concerned as trustee for the
bankrupts' estate, the claims of the secured lien creditors
attached to the proceeds received by Deseret at their trusteE
sale in the same priority as they were previously attached
to the subject real estate, and that he, as trustee for the
unsecured creditors, would only claim an interest in the
proceeds received from a subsequent sale by Deseret in excess
over those received by Deseret's trustee's sale on November
9, 1979.
(R. 64-65)

Judge Sawaya ruled that the previous dismissal by the bankruptcy c
was not res judicata to the state court action.

(R. 69)

At trial the court found that Mr. Bailey was Assignee of the
Ivory

& Company

second Trust Deed (R. 113) and entitled to the

excess proceeds at Trustee's Sale ..

(R. 113, 122-125).

The court

further found that the proceeds of sale exceeded by $2,032.58 that
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which the bank was entitled under the Trust deed pursuant to
r,',/-1-29 (R.
t

113, 122-125).

The bank does not here dispute these

tndings of the' trial court.
ARGUMENT
POINT I:

THE BANKRUPTCY COURT'S DISMISSAL OF MR. BAILEY'S
COMPLAINT WAS NOT RES JUDICATA AS TO THE ISSUES
SINCE BOTH THE POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES AND
THE ISSUES WERE DIFFERENT IN STATE COURT.

The essence of the bank's first point on appeal is that the
nautre and gist of Mr. Bailey's bankruptcy complaint and Mr. Bailey's
state court complaint were identical, making dismissal of the
bankruptcy court complaint a bar to the action filed in the state
court.

Even a superficial examination of the complaints demonstrates

rudimentary differences.

's

CO'.

Bankruptcy Court Complaint

State Court Claims Upon Which
Court Granted Judgment

Position of Plaintiff

Position of Plaintiff

Third Position Mechanics
Lien Holder and/or Purchaser
under Uniform Real Estate
Contract from Bankrupts.

Assignee of Ivory and Company's
Second Position Trust Deed.
(R. 003, Paragraph 10.a.)

Relief Sought Against Bank
As Lender

Relief Granted Against Bank
As Lender

1. For an Order declaring
defendant (s) . . . Deed of
Trust void and requiring said
defendant to release the same
from the subject property.
2.
For an Order requiring
defendant Deseret to accept
payment from plaintiff.
. . . and reinstating said
note and Trust Deed . . .

NONE

-6Bankruptcy Court Complaint
5.
For damages against the
defendant Deseret for its
breach of its fiduciary duty
to the plaintiff in wrongfully
disbursing funds on the loan.
and for an Order requiring Deseret
to account for all transactions
with regard to the subject
loan . . .

State Court Claims Upon Whir
Court Granted Judgment

NONE

Relief Sought Against Bank
In Its Position as Trustee

Relief Granted Against Bank
In Its Position as Trustee

4.
For an Order enjoining the
sale by the defendant and its
attorney scheduled for November
9, 1979 at 10:00 a.m.

[For an Order] to pay to th<
plaintiff and the other parti
entitled to the proceeds ofr
Trustee's Sale such amounts
and in such priority as the'·
shall determine.

It is clear from the comparision above, that the court based
its award only upon that which was new and unique to the state cour
complaint.

The court's memorandum decision provides in pertinent

as follows:
The Court further finds that when the Bankruptcy Court
refused to take jurisdiction over the excess funds, if there
be any, then the State Court could proceed pursuant to
§57-1-29 to adjudicate the priority and the rights to the
proceeds of the trustee's sale.
That the plaintiff did take an assignment of a trust
deed from Ellis R. Ivory, successor in interest to Ivory,
Inc. formerly known as Ivory Company, a Utah corporation
and stands in their position as far a priority is concerned.
That the note and trust deed provides for 97. interest and
that the defendant in the foreclosure proceedings did
charge interest at the rate of 107. from the date the note
was declared due and payable.
This was agreed to in the
construction agreement but was not in the security agreements and the Court finds it was an improper
ab
the trustee sale. The Court also finds that the attorney's
fees were excessive, thata proper attorney fee would
be the amount of $3,000.00 and $200.00 costs.

- 7-

Based on the foregoing, the Court awards judgment to
the plaintiff in the sum of $650.67 and $300.00 as amounts
received at the trustee sale over and above what the
beneficiary is entitled to. (R. 113-114)
L;iter the court amended its decision, and awarded Mr. Bailey an
additional $1,081.91 for foreclosure attorney's fees bid at sale but
not actually paid by the bank. (R. 125, paragraph 10)
The case cited by the Bank, Krofcheck v. Downey State Bank,
580 P.2d 243 (Utah, 1978) lists three criteria which must be met
before a cause of action is barred by the doctrine of res judicata:
Identity of parties, identity of claims and disposal of those claims
on the merits.

Let us examine these points separately.

(1) The two cases must be between the same parties or
their privies.
Though one of the named plaintiffs and one of the named
defendants in the bankruptcy suit are the plaintiff and defendant in
this case, their porisions and capacities ·are different.
Mr. Bailey sued in bankruptcy court as a third position
mechanic's lien holder and as a sixth position purchaser of the
bankrupts' equity in the property. (R. 003)

In the state court

action, Mr. Bailey was granted relief as the assignee of the position
of Ivory and Co. (R. 122)

In Conway v. Mosher 103 P.2d 456

(Ariz., 1940) the Arizona Supreme Court held that where the Assignor
(State of Arizona) had not been a party to a quiet title action its
grantee or assignee was not bound by the quiet title action even
though the grantee had been a party to the action in a different
capacity.
. [I]f the state was not foreclosed by the action
to quiet title, neither was its assignee or grantee. (P. 467)

-8Likewise, if Ivory and Company's interest against the bank was

11111

foreclosed by the bankruptcy dismissal, then neither was ils "''·':
(Mr. Bailey) even though he was a party to the bankruptcy compldini
The Bank was sued in the first action primarily as a first
position lien holder and as a lender.

Mr. Bailey challenged the

bank's right to be in first position, claiming that as a lendor
the bank had failed to properly distribute the construction loan fun:
to Bailey who had provided materials to the property.

In the state

court action, Mr. Bailey was granted judgment against the Trustee
who happened to be the bank but could just as well have been a title
company or an attorney.

The different capacities of the bank in

the two actions should be considered by the court.
Professor James Wm. Moore's

Treatise on Federal Practice at

Res Judicata Paragraph 0.411 [3.-2] Volume lB Page 427 states as
follows:
As we have seen, the practical view of parties for
purposes of res judicata centers on the interest that is
litigated rather than the names that appear in the
pleadings . . . The capacities rule is but the other side
of the coin; where the names are the same but the interests
put into the litigationlJeIOng to others, res judicata
follows the interest and not the name.
Since Mr. Bailey asked the bankruptcy court to order the bank as
trustee to stay the Trustee's Sale, Respondent unfortunately cannot
claim complete lack of identity of the parties, but the different
capacities in which the bank serves relative to the claims in the
two actions is at least illustrative of the differences in the
transactional facts of the two actions.
(2) There must have been a final judgment on the
merits of the prior case.

- 9-

Rule 4l(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides
1

an involuntary dismissal is a dismissal on the merits.

The

1ecord indicates that the dismissal was in fact voluntary and
therefore not with prejudice.

Counsel for Mr. Bailey submitted

his Affidavit to the court which provides in part as follows:
8. Judge Ralph R. Mabey granted a temporary restraining
order on November 9, 1979, at 10:00 a.m. However, the
order was not timelv served on the defendant's trustee until
after the trustee's. sale had been accomplished. In connection with the issuance of the temporary order, the Court
set a hearing date in this matter for November 13, 1979.
Both the undersigned affiant and counsel for the defendant
were present at the hearing.
9. At the haring referred to above, the issues raised
by the plaintiff in its complaint in the Bankruptcy Court
were not tried, and the matter was not dismissed with
prejudice. The matter was dismissecr-after discussion
between counsel and the Court because the issue of whether
the sale should be delayed and whether the plaintiff
should be allowed to cure the loan with the defendant
were moot. It was understood by the Judge and counsel,
that the funds received at the trustee's sale did not
exceed, by far, the amount of the secured claims on the
property. The Judge stated that because of the secured
claims on the subject property, and the amount of the
proceeds at the Trust Deed Trustee's Sale, the bankruptcy
trustee, John Green, would have no claim on those proceeds,
and the Bankruptcy Court would not be interested in
adjudicating the claims to those funds. Therefore, the
bankruptcy Judge suggested that the Bankruptcy Court should
not be involved in this aspect of this matter, i.e. the
adjudication of priority in the funds received by the
trustee, Edward M. Garrett, acting on behalf of the defendant.
This court should find that the plaintiff's undisputed agreement to
the dismissal limited the res judicata effect of the dismissal to
only those items specifically raised in the bankruptcy complaint.
(3) The prior adjudication must have involved the
same issue or an issue that could or should have been
raised therein.
The court below gave judginent to Mr. Bailey ordering the bank
to distribute the excess proceeds of sale to plaintiff pursuant to

-10Utah Code Annotated§57-l-29.

No claim for distribution of excess

proceeds of sale was raised in the bankruptcy court complaint.
fact, no claim _could have been made in the complaint since the
had not yet taken place.

On the contrary, the fervent intent ol

Bailey's complaint in bankruptcy court was to prevent the sale fruc
taking place.

It was only after the essence of his complaint had

been mooted by sale of the property and after the bankruptcy court
had indicated that it did not care to be involved in the dispute
over the proceeds of the Trustee's Sale (R. 63, 64) that the state
court action was brought.
It is clear that the state court cause was not actually brought
in the earlier case.

"Could or Should" the claim have been raised

in the bankruptcy court?

The could or should language of Utah and

many other state cases is not very helpful.

No court, including

Utah's, has interpreted "should or could" to mean "was it possible
to".

Any permissable counterclaim, for instance, could be brought

in an action by defendant, but only compulsory counterclaims are
barred by res judicata if the defendant fails to raise them.
Arizona interprets "could or should" to mean "could have been
brought based upon the points in the record."
601 P.2d 605 (Ariz. 1979).

Vance v. Vance

Kansas used a different test.

the claim have been litigated under the facts which gave rise to
the cause of action?"

Jay Hawk Equipment Company vs. Mentzer

379 P. 2d 342 (Kan., 1973).
Respondent's research.

Any specific Utah test has escaped

If this court has not adopted a specific

test, Respondent respectfully ,submits that the Rule proposed in
the restatement (second) and argued for by Professor Moore is the
preferable rule.

-11-

Vol.

The Restatement of the Law Second Judgments 2d
1 §24 provides as follows:

(1)
When a valid and final judgment rendered in an
acLion extinguishes the plaintiff's claim pursuant to the
rules.of merger or bar, the claim extinguished includes
all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the
defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of transactions, out of which the action
arose.
What factual grouping constitutes a "transaction"
"series", are to be determined

and

The transactional facts of the two cases are disperate.

The first

cause dealt with allegations of a defective Trust Deed and wrongful
pay out of construction loan funds to the damage of a materialman
who supplied materials to the construction site.

The complaint

asked for damages as a result, for voiding of the first position
Trust Deed and for injunction of Trustee's· Sale or for reinstatement
of the loan.

The state court cause resulted in an order causing the

Trustee on the Trust Deed to disperse excess proceeds of sale.

No

damages were awarded nor was the bank's first position Trust Deed
invalidated.

The transactions are separated in time, space and

origin and could reasonably be expected from a business standpoint
to be considered separate transactions.

Defendant must argue that

if a junior lien claimant unsuccessfully attacks a first position
lender, that lien claimant automatically loses all position in the
property andmay not pursue excess proceeds at Trustee's Sale.

The

facts of this case require defendant to take this argument even
further.

Since Mr. Bailey's bankruptcy court complaint was based

on a third and sixth position in the property where his state court

-12complaint was based on a second position in the property which was
assigned to him, the bank would have the court rule that should;,
third position lien holder unsuccessfully challenge the rights
a first position lender that all junior lien holders lose all

ul

1 lici,

rights to the property whether they are parties or not.
The bankruptcy court's order did not bar plaintiff's complaint
in the state court.
POINT II:

THE BANKRUPTCY COURT'S ORDER ON ITS FACE CLEARLY
DOES NOT EXTEND THE JURISDICTION OF THE BANKRUPTCY
COURT THROUGH TO THE PROCEEDS OF SALE

While it is true that 28 U.S.C. §1471 grants exclusive
jurisdiction over the property of the bankrupt to the bankruptcy
court.

It is just as clear that the bankruptcy trustee may on his

own motion or upon petition by other claimants, abandon jurisdiction
of the property.

11 U.S.C.

§554 provides in pertinent part as folio

(a) After notice and a hearing, the Trustee may abandon
any property of the estate that is burdensome to the estate
or that is of inconsequential value to the estate.
(b) On request of a party in interest and after notice
and a hearing, the court may order the Trustee to abandon
any property of the estate that is burdensome to the estate
and that is of inconsequential value to the estate.

* * *
Though the banks complaint in reclaimation to obtain abandonment
of real property was an unorthodox if not incorrect procedure for
a secured creditor, it nevertheless was effective and the bankruptcy
court abandoned its jurisdiction as follows:
That the relief sought in the complaint by Deseret
Federal Savings and Loan Association is granted and said
Association may proceed to Trustee's Sale on the real
property descirbed in the complaint herein pursuant to
the laws of the state of Uta:h. (R. 40-41)

-13Once the bankruptcy court has abandoned property, it is irrevocable.
111

Polumbo 271 F. Supp 640 (DC Va., 1967).

I o·:n ly abandoned the property,
;t

Though the court

the bank to obtain such a ruling,

ipulated and agreed that should it obtain the property at the

Trustee's Sale, it would then offer this property for sale in a
commercially reasonable manner and pay the excess to the court.

The

second part of the Order of the Court provided as follows:
In the event that Deseret Federal Savings and Loan
Association should be the successful bidder at the Trustee's
Sale and shall acquire title to part or all of the real
property herein, free of other liens, then the property
so acquired shall be offered for sale by the Association
in a commercially reasonable manner and in the event that
the sum in excess of that necessary to fully satisfy the
note, Trust Deed, interest, costs and attorney's fees is
realized upon the sale, such excess shall be paid over to
the cout for further disposition. (R. 40-41) (Emphasis added)
Though Deseret Federal acquired the property, the results of a
commercially reasonable sale are not in evidence or issue in this
action.

It is clear that any amounts to be paid into bankruptcy

court are amounts realized from a second sale, a commercially
reasonable sale, not the Trustee's Sale.
The Third Judicial District Court was put into a position
of having to interpret the meaining and import of a bankruptcy order.
On its face and with the further clarification given by the affidavit
of James R.

Ivins, the court reasonably construed the order of the

bankruptcy court to mean that the bankruptcy trustee had abandoned
any claim to the proceeds of the Trustee's Sale and that the priority
and distribution of the proceeds of the Trustee's Sale could be
distributed as the state court directed pursuant U.C.A. 57-1-29.
The lower court did not err in•. its interpretation that the
bankruptcy court had abandoned its interest in the proceeds.

-14POINT III:

DEFENDANT FAILED TO FOLLOW APPROPRIATE PROCEDURE
FOR HAULTING THE ACTION IN STATE COURT

It was defendant's responsibility to get an Order from
bankruptcy court staying the proceeding and superceding the
jurisdiction of the state court.

The bank argues that the purpose

and effect of the bankruptcy court orders have been thwarted by
action in the state court.

Substantially prior to trial, the

bank brought a Motion for Stnnmary Judgment.

In its memorandum,

the bank argued as follows:
It must be conceded that the bankruptcy court had
full and complete jurisdiction of all matters relating to
the said Lot 46 and acted thereon. That being the case,
this court has no jurisdiction over the matters sought
to be litigated by plaintiff. This jurisdiction continues
over the property of the bankrupt until the bankruptcy
court formally divests itself of jurisdiction by
abandonment or in some other manner. (R. 19,20)
When the state court clearly rejected the bank's interpretation
of the bankruptcy court rulings, the bank.should have gone back to
bankruptcy court to obtain an order clearly asserting the bankruptcy court's desire to maintain jurisdiction over the property.
This would have been a relatively simple procedure and had that been
the true intent of the bankruptcy court the trial and this appeal
would have been avoided.

Respondent submits that the bank should

be estopped from asserting a contrary interpretation of the
bankruptcy court's order.
CONCLUSION
The judgment by the court below was based upon the plaintiff',
suit for an order directing the disposition of proceeds of the
Trustee's Sale pursuant to

U.C.A.

raised nor litigated in the bankruptcy court.

This issue was neithei
The directed

-15-

distribution to Mr. Bailey was based on the rights of the Ivory
second trust deed.

The state action below arose only after the

!lank as trustee conducted the sale while the bankruptcy court action
was connnenced prior to the trustee's sale and sought to prevent
the trustee's sale and to adjudicate the validity of the first lien
of the bank.

Mr. Bailey's action in this matter was not, therefore,

barred by res judicata.

The lower court did not err in so holding

nor did the court err in its findings that the bankruptcy court
had abandoned the proceeds of the trustee's sale by its specific
order.

The judgment of the lower court should be affirmed.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

of August, 1983.
NEWTON & IVINS

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that two correct copies of the foregoing
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF were mailed to Edward M. Garrett, Joseph E.
Hatch, GARRETT & STURDY, 311 South State Street, Suite 320, Salt
Lake City, UT

84111 this

/(:z..--- day

of August, 1983.

APPENDIX 1

li7-1-29. Proceeds of trustee's 1al-Di.sposition.-The trustee shall
apply the proceeds of the trustee's sale, firat, to the costs and expenses of
exercising the power of sale and of the sale, including the payment of
the trustee's and attorney's fees actually incurred not to exceed the amount
which may he pr.ovided for in the trust deed, second, to payment of the
obligation secured by the trust deed, and the balance, if any, to the peraon
or persona legally entiUed thereto, or the trustee, in his discretion, may
deposit the balance of such proceeds with the county clerk of the county
in which the sale took place. Upon depositing such balance, the trustee
shall be discharged from all further responsibility therefor and the
county clerk shall deposit the same with the county treasurer subject to
the order of the district court of said county.
Jlhtol')': L. 1961, ch. 181, § lL

